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 Writing in 1950, Aimé Césaire would use the pages of his Discourse on Colonialism  in order to 
make a shocking proposition. In the immediate shadow of the Nazi genocide, Césaire would forcefully 
assert that Europe is unforgiving of Hitler not for “the crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the 
humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and 
the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively 
for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India and the blacks of Africa.”1 This impassioned denunciation of 
European humanism serves as one point of departure for considering how the Holocaust abuts other 
genocidal histories, including the predatory swathes of the European colonialisms. I invoke Césaire here 
not merely because his gesture is hospitable to contemporary constructions of Holocaust memory that 
resist its identitarian appropriations at a time when Holocaust memory is itself being globalized—one of 
the themes that the present volume addresses.  Rather the historicity of his utterance has different 
lessons to disclose. For Césaire, as writer and politician who helps to constitute the trajectory of 
Négritude as the intellectual concomitant of anti-colonial resistance, the mobilization of what he terms 
“Hitlerism” is subordinated to the urgent political priorities of decolonization. Indeed, the very appellation 
“Hitlerism” seems anomalous as we hear it here long after the fact of its enunciation. It suggests that the 
Holocaust, for Césaire, had not yet acceded to its construction in the guise with which we currently 
associate the term, this particular term—catachresis, strenuous synecdoche and signifier of radical evil at 
one and the same time. Yet there is still more that can stand revealed here.  To apprehend Césaire 
without the sediment of retrospect, without anachrony, is to agree with Michael Rothberg’s assessment: 
“the emergence of the collective memory of the Nazi genocide in the 1950s and 1960s takes place in a 
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punctual dialogue with ongoing processes of decolonization and civil rights struggle and their modes of 
coming to terms with colonialism, slavery, and racism.”2   
Césaire is indeed pivotal to the important intellectual project that Rothberg initiates as 
“multidirectional memory” in the title of his 2009 volume.3 This is no coincidence. Rothberg’s paradigm of 
multidirectional memory sees “the emergence of Holocaust memory and the unfolding of decolonization 
as overlapping and not separate processes,” as he writes elsewhere. 4 Multidirectional memory contests 
identitarian constructions of collective memory that foreclose the distance between past and present in a 
manner which “excludes elements of alterity and forms of commonality with others.”5 “Ultimately,” 
Rothberg will declare, “memory is not a zero-sum game.”6 His volume thus offers a powerful antidote to 
the “ugly contest[s] of comparative victimization” that suffuse the cultural politics of our times.7  
 The present essay is in many ways predicated on Rothberg’s intervention—one whose 
disciplinary consequences for postcolonial cultural studies and literary theory, on the one hand, and for 
Holocaust studies, on the other I certainly endorse.8 I share his suggestion that “the ordinarily 
unacknowledged history of cross-referencing that characterizes the period of decolonization continues to 
this day and constitutes a precondition of contemporary discourse,” particularly insofar as Rothberg goes 
on to suggest that the “virulence” of competitive memory discourses has to do “partly with the rhetorical 
and cultural intimacy of seemingly opposed traditions of remembrance.”9 My own concerns in this paper 
will be different, however. I will orient myself less to the history of cross-referencing whose contours and 
consequences Rothberg so admirably sketches, than to the strange intimacies of dis/avowal that obtain 
between Holocaust studies and postcolonial theory, heirs to the thickened temporality that Rothberg 
condenses as “Auschwitz and Algeria” in one memorable syntagm.10 Legatees of this shared moment, 
however, the two paradigms also crucially partake of the competition between these two configurations 
of memory.  
The foundational text for the emergence of postcolonial theory as a disciplinary paradigm is, of 
course, Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978).11 Said’s insistence on the materiality of a set of discourses held 
famously to constitute the world they purport merely to describe in accordance with the racialized logic of 
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the unremitting binary--Occident versus Orient--performs what Walter Benjamin might have recognized 
as the work of a historical materialism. In its disaggregation of “civilization,” on the one hand, and “race,” 
on the other, postcolonial theory has articulated some of the major ethical and epistemological, historical 
and historiographic implications of Benjamin’s well known pronouncement: “There is no document of 
civilization that is not simultaneously a document of barbarism.”12 For Said, whose analysis is presaged 
on Foucault’s notion of discourse, this is literally the case. Subsequent elaborations of postcolonial theory 
will insist, in a manner congruent with the later Foucault, that race is the biopolitical signifier which 
renders the “civilizing mission” literally murderous, thus returning discourse to a fateful intersection with 
the materiality of bodies over which it holds dominion.13  
Well before its articulation by Foucault, this structural determinant of what Achille Mbembe has 
termed “necropolitics” would have been familiar to Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Hannah Arendt.14  
“African colonial possessions,” Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism “became the most fertile 
soil for the flowering of the Nazi elite.”15  The trajectory to be emphasized is causal rather than merely 
chronological as Arendt’s anatomy of racism seeks to demonstrate. The necropolitical mobilization of race 
is common to the Nazi genocide and to the genocidal irruptions that periodically characterized 
colonialism, as certain postcolonial theorists would reiterate in fidelity, variously, to Foucault or to the 
intellectuals who shaped the era of decolonization.16 To arrogate the causality of genocide to racism, as 
the biopolitical tack requires, rather than to a more rarefied dynamic of anti-Semitism, is a gesture that 
itself sets this trajectory within postcolonial theory in opposition to the historiographic trajectory 
emerging from Jewish—and particularly hegemonic Israeli—constructions of the Holocaust. Moreover, the 
narrative of anti-Semitism cannot, in the latter variant, be disentangled from the authorizing tropes of 
Israeli nationhood. It is here, with reference to the very grounds of the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinian people, that postcolonialism will play its most adversarial role with respect to post-Holocaust 
identitarian claims of Israeli Jews and diasporic Zionists. Said’s “Zionism from the Standpoint of its 
Victims” is obviously the landmark text here.17   
4 
 
Yet for all that the Jewish body remains, by and large, unmourned in the canonical texts of 
postcolonial theory, the Holocaust has, I seek to argue, made an engagement with the ascendancy of 
witness compelling for postcolonialism precisely because it, too, comes after; it, too,  inhabits the 
traumatic belatedness of catastrophe. Precisely this shared habitation undergirds the theoretical 
humanities in a general sense, as Robert Eaglestone observes: “postmodernism—understood as 
poststructuralism, a still developing tradition of post-phenomenological philosophy—is a response to the 
Holocaust.”18 Although I would not like to dissociate postcolonialism (in some of its variants) from post-
structuralism in the genealogy that Eaglestone constructs, my own concerns here will be narrower. The 
fact that postcolonial studies inhabits a particular temporality of the aftermath, I suggest, opens 
postcolonial discourse in its nascent institutionalization during the late-1970s and 1980s to cultural tropes 
of witnessing that first arose in the specific context of the institutionalization of Holocaust memory, but 
that have been generalized beyond this context. The performance of witness, I will claim, is encoded in 
certain canonical texts of postcolonial theory as an unacknowledged substrate, present in excess of its 
analysis of testimonial practice oriented to the peculiar deformations occasioned by the rendering of 
subaltern histories in the colonial archive. My emphasis here thus falls not so much on the construction of 
the aftermath which Rothberg parses as the state of being nach Auschwitz, that is to say, after but also 
crucially oriented towards the Holocaust; and simultaneously but differently, the state of being après 
l’Algérie. 19 Rather, I will focus on forms of witnessing that emerge as the currency of the aftermath 
where currency is understood in a dual sense: equally as that which sediments and standardizes value, 
and as that which limns the Holocaust between the lines of contemporary academic discourse.  
I will begin to substantiate these claims by revisiting Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism in order 
to exhume the forms of identification available to him during the period immediately after the Nazi 
genocide. I will trace the manner in which he routes his denunciation of colonialism through a rhetoric 
that memorializes its victims. I will then contrast Césaire’s grammar of memorialization with the gestures, 
the genres, of identification mobilized by the contemporary postcolonial philosopher, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, contextualizing her interventions with respect to the consolidation of the Jewish survivor as 
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construct. I will explore the disjunctive dissemination of this construct in its unlikely postcolonial haunt, 
but will also treat Spivak’s aporetic reprise of testimony in light of the debate on the ethics of witness 
that Holocaust studies inaugurates.    
 
 cities that evaporate at the edge of the sword 
 
 Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, first published in 1950 and republished in Présence Africaine 
in 1955 is, as we have already noted, significant for its claim that the Nazi genocide is essentially bound 
up with the history of colonialism. The violence that Europe wreaks revisits those who disavow it, he 
emphasizes. Before the Europeans were “victims” of the “supreme barbarism” of Nazism, Césaire insists, 
“they were its accomplices.”20 Let us return to the claim with which I opened this essay: 
 [I] t would be worthwhile to study clinically, in detail the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism 
 and to reveal to the very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth 
 century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, 
 that Hitler is his demon, that if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and that, at bottom, 
 what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the 
 humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white 
 man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been 
 reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India and the blacks of Africa.21  
Césaire’s evocation of Hitler as a monstrous synecdoche, indeed as a synecdoche for the monstrous, puts 
on display for us one register in which it was possible, five years after the end of World War II, to 
apprehend the murderous excesses of the Nazi regime, in advance of such catachreses as “Holocaust” or 
Shoah.  It is telling for what it cannot yet say, at least not in the terms with which we are familiar. The 
most significant omission is, of course, that of the Jew. Note that Césaire figures the Nazi genocide as a 
“crime against the white man.” The elision of the Jews as a direct referent here constitutes a disavowal 
which crucially misrecognizes the distance between the denigration, literally, of the Jew in Nazi ideology, 
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and the category of whiteness—in the brutalizing Aryan construction of the latter.22 This misrecognition is 
partly a consequence of the structural underpinnings of Césaire’s philosophy of history. The Discourse 
radicalizes the matter of European complicity by virtue of its thesis of the choc en retour or the “reverse 
shock” that figures Nazism as the return of a specifically colonial form of the repressed.23 The Jews are 
assimilated to a crisis within Europe consequent on the corrosion that colonial violence inevitably trails.  
“[N]o one colonizes with impunity,” Césaire asserts.24 As symptoms of this crisis, the Jews are not yet 
positioned in relations of alterity with respect to European whiteness.  
It is only subsequently, as Césaire’s recalibrates his position with reference to the events of 
decolonization on the one hand, and Stalinism, on the other, that the Jews will accede to a particular 
history, theorized within the general context of racism.  Rothberg notes significant shifts in Césaire’s 
position between the first publication of the Discourse in 1950, and the Lettre à Maurice Thorez published 
in 1956—a text that announces his break with the French Communist Party. Césaire’s repudiation of 
Communism as a man of color, Rothberg argues, uses anti-Semitism to name “the problem of 
particularities that the party cannot subsume.”25 Rothberg finds further evidence of the altered vector of 
Césaire’s position on anti-Semitism in the ironic reference to the work of French ethnographer Roger 
Caillois whose racism Césaire denounces in the revised 1955 edition of the Discourse in the following 
satirical manner: “M. Caillois gives immediate proof [of the superiority of the West] by concluding that no 
one should be exterminated. With him the Negroes are sure that they will not be lynched; the Jews, that 
they will not feed new bonfires.”26 
 It is worth noting, however, that the trope itself does not yet commit Césaire to the historicizing 
thrust of the 1956 text.  The emplacement of blacks and Jews in relations of equivalence is not always 
sufficient repudiation of anti-Semitism, as an investigation of the history of this particular topos shows. 
Similar parallelisms are, in fact, relatively common in the discourse of African-American civil rights 
activists in the United States during the 1930s. Harold Brackman speaks of W.E.B. du Bois’s “residual 
insensitivity to Jewish sensibilities” in an editorial that du Bois published in The Crisis in September 
1933.27 “Nothing has filled us with such unholy glee as Hitler and the Nordics,” writes Du Bois. “When the 
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only ‘inferior’ peoples were ‘niggers,’ it was hard to get the attention of the New York Times for little 
matters of race, lynchings and mobs. But now that the damned include the owner of the Times, moral 
indignation is perking up.”28 “A cruel irony of the 1930s,” Brackman notes, “was how often African-
American anger at white people’s stubborn blindness to the analogy between anti-Semitic barbarism 
abroad and racism at home came to be directed against anti-Hitler protests for allegedly distracting 
attention from antiblack racism or even against Jews for somehow deserving anti-Jewish animus” (59-60, 
see also pp. 60-61).29 Reduced to a counter in a black economy of identification, the invocation of the 
figure of the Jew actually occludes rather than promotes an analysis of the historical contours of anti-
Semitism or of its murderous implementation by the Nazi regime.  
Césaire manifests a similar tendency at times, using the trope of the Jew to stage an equivalence 
that is also equivocation. His Notebook of a Return to the Native Land  [Cahier d’un retour au pays natal] 
first published in 1939, and twice revised in 1947 and 1956, mobilizes the Jew thus:  
 To go away 
 As there are hyena-men and panther-men, 
 I would be a jew-man 
 A Kaffir-man 
 A Hindu-man-from-Calcutta 
 A Harlem-man-who-doesn’t-vote 
  
 the famine-man, the insult-man, the torture-man you can grab 
 anytime, beat up, kill—no joke, kill—without having to account 
 to anyone, without having to make excuses to anyone 
 a jew-man 
  a pogrom-man (1983: 43 ).30  
The “jew-man” figured as “pogrom-man” fails to coincide with the Jew as the historical victim not of 
pogrom--but of genocide or incipient genocide. For Césaire has different priorities. The relations of 
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equivalence to which Jewish victimhood is subordinated in the Notebook are cognate with Césaire’s 
analysis in his Discourse on Colonialism, namely that racialized violence, across its individual 
manifestations, denudes the public sphere of accountability—denudes it, in fact, of all politics except for 
the necropolitics of domination. The victims of Nazi racism and colonial racism whom Césaire enumerates 
are each subordinated to the master narrative, the master’s narrative, of impunity: “without having to 
account/to anyone, without having to make excuses to anyone,” as the Notebook asserts.31 The figure of 
the Jew is not (yet) invested with a form of victimhood that is irreducibly tied to the Holocaust, nor is the 
latter understood to be unique in itself.  
The Discourse on Colonialism  will insist on staging a different primal scene of suffering, instead. 
Césaire continues to route his theme—“that no one colonizes with impunity”—through a litany of colonial 
massacres.  “[B]y no means,” he assures us, “because I take a morbid delight in them, but because I 
think that these heads of men, these collections of ears, these burned houses, these Gothic invasions, 
this steaming blood, these cities that evaporate at the edge of the sword, are not to be so easily disposed 
of. They prove that colonization, I repeat, dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial 
activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on contempt for the native and justified by 
that contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it [….]”32 The cumulative elaboration of 
atrocity allows Césaire to stage a form of hyperbolic mourning whose excess serves as the displaced 
mimesis of the excessive violence of colonialism. “[S]hould I have cast back into the shadows of 
oblivion,” he asks in response to the criticism of an imagined interlocutor, “the memorable feat of arms of 
General Gérard and kept silent about the capture of Ambike, a city which, to tell the truth, had never 
dreamed of defending itself: ‘The native riflemen had orders to kill only the men, but no one restrained 
them; intoxicated by the smell of blood, they spared not one woman, not one child . . . . At the end of 
the afternoon, the heat caused a light mist to arise: it was the blood of the five thousand victims, the 
ghost of the city, evaporating in the setting sun.’”33  Césaire’s strenuous efforts to memorialize those he 
mourns seem labored in retrospect, precisely to the extent that the “traumatic sublime” in Dominick La 
Capra’s sense is depersonalized.34 There is as yet no cathexis in place that might take the exemplarity of 
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the Jewish survivor as the model of its desire. Not even the trope of “the Jew” is capable of instigating 
such an itinerary, as its irruptions demonstrate. Hyperbole turns Césaire’s mourning work back on itself, 
rendering it intransitive or “melancholic” in the familiar Freudian inflection.35 Melancholic hyperbole does 
the work of a depersonalized identification with the dead at a time when the inception of a crisis that we 
might stenographically evoke through the toponyms Madagascar, Indochina, Algeria speaks to the 
ongoing need to commemorate those killed resisting French imperialism. 36  Yet for all that it is 
depersonalized, Césaire’s  melancholic rhetoric gestures towards the enfolding of the victims of colonial 
aggression within the orbit of that political relation which Judith Butler would come to designate as a 
“grievable life.”37  
  
 the cry of the survivor 
Césaire’s purchase over the affect of atrocity founders, I have been suggesting, precisely because 
identification—as a mark of the genre Eli Wiesel catachrestically terms “testimony” has not yet been 
routinized through the category of the Jewish survivor.38 My recourse to the terms “testimony” and 
“identification” is indebted to the particular inflection that the literary theorist Robert Eaglestone gives 
them in his 2004 study The Holocaust and the Postmodern which tracks central debates concerning the 
Holocaust in the field of literature, historiography and philosophy.39 Affect is crucial to the manner in 
which Eaglestone recuperates Wiesel’s own particular “hyperbole.”40 Eaglestone ties his claims to the 
manner in which Holocaust testimony, as a genre reworked in a specifically post-1945 modality, is read. 
Its affect, he argues, is of a particular kind. While narrative texts and other forms of representation 
produce affect through generating identification, “the grasping, or comprehending, of another’s 
experience as one’s own by ‘putting one’s self in their place’” says Eaglestone, or through “taking the 
other as oneself,” it is precisely here that the specificity of Holocaust narrative arises.41 For Holocaust 
testimony disallows the very purchase that identification offers, given the ethical consequences of the 
“incomprehension” that attaches to the genocide on the part of those who experienced it.42 It disallows 
10 
 
identification, moreover, because it ruptures the very codes of referentiality itself. 43 It is in its disruption 
of identification, then, that Holocaust testimony becomes something new; becomes the site of an 
“aporia” in Jacques Derrida’s sense.44  Instead of the seizure of the other, Eaglestone offers his readers 
the caesura of a certain version of literariness , deeply indebted to Viktor Shkovsky’s notion of 
estrangement, in order to render a certain construction of testimony compatible with the ethics of 
Holocaust memory.45 
Identification is, however, not only an ineluctable component of narrative as Eaglestone 
repeatedly asserts.46 Affect, more broadly speaking, must also be given a constitutive role in structuring 
social relations. Sarah Ahmed has recently taught us that affect is performative. Emotions “do things,” in 
Ahmed’s account: “they align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social space—through 
the very intensity of their attachments.”47 Ahmed argues that the circulation of emotions between “bodies 
and signs” plays a role in the demarcation of individual as well as of collective identity.48 For Eaglestone 
also, identification is part of the armature of identity construction, although he does not fully articulate 
the trajectory that makes identification “central not only in aesthetics but also politics.”49 But to tie 
identification to processes of identity construction and, I would add, to processes of interpellation is to 
recognize that topoi of identification circulate widely in culture, in a variety of media, including texts—and 
circulate to different effect. It is not merely that “Holocaust fiction is, in Edward’s Said’s terms, ‘wordly’” 
as Eaglestone writes.50 Identifications themselves possess a form of wordliness. Acts of identification with 
Holocaust testimony proceed, proceed perforce, proceed despite interdiction --as Eaglestone rightly 
concedes—because they are worldly.51 Identification must, in other words, itself be historicized. It must 
be historicized, moreover, against the background of the ascendancy of the construct of the Jewish 
survivor since the forms of assimilative identification or surrogacy against which Eaglestone and others 
caution us, all the way back to Primo Levi, derive their present cultural purchase as well as the affective 
contracts they set in motion, I suggest, from the adjacent category of the survivor-as-witness.  
The claim that the emergence of the survivor—as cultural construct rather than as human 
subject—postdates the liberation of the Nazi camps is not, of course, a new one. In an exemplary work of 
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historicization, the cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander shows that identification with Jewish survivors of 
the Nazi genocide did not take place in the immediate post-war period when the “Holocaust” was still 
subsumed under another category--that of “atrocity”: “For an audience to be traumatized by an 
experience which they themselves do not directly share, symbolic extension and psychological 
identification are required. This did not occur.” Instead, Alexander observes, the survivors “ […] could 
just as well have been from Mars, or from Hell. The identities and characters of these Jewish survivors 
rarely were personalized through interviews or individualized through biographical sketches [….]”52 Over 
time, Alexander argues, the genocide of the Jews of Europe was re-coded as tragedy—the term, for him, 
takes on a dramaturgical, indeed Aristotelian, cast. “In the new tragic understanding of the Jewish mass 
murder,” writes Alexander, “suffering, not progress, became the telos toward which the narrative was 
aimed.” 53 Suffering, as telos, requires a personalization of the genocide. It must be located within the 
circumference of a biography. Alexander treats the English translation and stage-dramatizations and film 
of Anne Frank’s Diary in the U.S., dating to 1952, 1955, and 1959 respectively, as the “prototype of [the] 
personalizing genre” but sees the reception of such narratives as eventually contributing to the erasure of 
the specificity of the genocide of the Jews given that the Holocaust undergoes a process of “symbolic 
extension” which eventually allows it to stand as the preeminent signifier of radical or “engorged evil.”54  
 Equally pivotal in the personalization of suffering is the Eichmann trial (1961), although we 
should immediately observe that what will be at stake is a delineation of the specificity of Jewish 
suffering in a highly determinate political context. In Anette Wieviorka’s influential analysis, the trial 
authorizes the admission of the Holocaust into the public sphere under the sign of the sovereignty of the 
Jewish State. Crucially, for Wieviorka, the trial confers on the survivors “the social identity of survivors 
because society now recognized them as such. […] At the heart of this newly recognized identity of 
survivor was a new function, to be the bearer of history. With the Eichmann trial, the witness becomes an 
embodiment of memory (un homme-mémoire), attesting to the past and to the continuing presence of 
the past. Concurrently, the genocide comes to be defined as a succession of individual experiences with 
which the public is supposed to identify.”55  
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Proceeding from such claims, we might state that the body of the survivor, imagined in its 
sedimentation as the amanuensis of the genocidal violence it endured, secures the supposedly 
unmediated referentiality of history precisely because it was the locus of reduction to the “bare life” of 
the camps in Giorgio Agamben’s schema56—or  to zoë in Arendt’s (1958).57 Indeed, the authenticity of 
the survivor drives the pedagogical intent of the Eichmann trial.58 But the testimonial exchange which 
restores the survivor to bios, precisely by conferring upon her the capacity to narrate, whether it occurs 
in a legal, therapeutic, or documentary context, is never reducible to the referentiality of what is narrated 
alone. The survivor does not speak until spoken for, by the various agendas which would do her justice—
therapeutic, nationalist, or universalizing. When the survivor’s speech is valorized for its authenticity, and 
when, in turn, that authenticity is seen as generating powerful emotion on the part of the survivor’s 
addressee—a power that Geoffrey Hartman ascribes to it when he holds the “immediacy of […] first-
person accounts” to “[burn] through the ‘cold-storage’ of history,” for instance,  we begin to perceive a 
certain excess that attaches to testimony under this construction.59 The survivor’s address must become 
compelling for its addressee as the corollary of the survivor’s individuation, her irreducible biography. The 
survivor is, in other words, constructed in a transitive modality. Identification on the part of the 
addressee now becomes the affective supplement to facticity which must be present in order to 
safeguard the performative dimensions of the testimonial exchange—that is to say, the conditions of its 
ethical and emotional intelligibility.  
Given the ascendancy of this transitive and performative configuration of the survivor for what 
Wieviorka has termed “the era of the witness,”60 it becomes possible for the media scholar John Durham 
Peters to adduce “the cry of the survivor” in constructing a typology of witness that encompasses, tout 
court, a tellingly reconfigured intersection of law, theology and--atrocity: “The third, most recent, source 
[for the notion of witness] dates from the Second World War: the witness as a survivor of hell, 
prototypically but not exclusively the Holocaust or Shoah. […] The procedures of the courtroom, the pain 
of the martyr and the cry of the survivor cast light on basic questions such as what it means to watch, to 
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narrate or to be present at an event.”61  The survivor is well on the way to becoming part of our cultural 
armature: an authorizing trope for increasingly codified forms of identification. 
 
 
 haunted by slight ghosts 
 Initially, at least, postcolonial theory seems indifferent to the forms of cathexis authorized by 
the survivor. As a political, historiographic and literary theoretical intervention, postcolonial theory 
disrupts Europe’s production of the racialized Other as a foil for its self-consolidating subjecthood and 
sovereignty, both.62 To the extent that its program necessarily crosses the archive, indeed the literal 
archives, of colonialism, postcolonial theory must elaborate a methodology for transcribing the traces of 
the figure whom we know as the “subaltern” in a manner which counters an effacement always already 
predicated upon the disciplinary construction of History in the West. For elaborations of this problematic, 
see Dipesh Chakrabarty 1994; Spivak 1985).63 For Spivak, the exemplarity of the subaltern—and not, it is 
almost superfluous to add, the survivor--grounds a form of historiographic critique proper to 
postcolonialism and adequate to its political and ethical aspirations. Let us now intersect Spivak as she 
crosses the historiographic revisions of Hayden White and, more particularly, Dominick LaCapra in their 
respective attempts to perform history after the so-called linguistic turn.  
 Where LaCapra, a key thinker in Holocaust studies, draws upon Freudian psychoanalysis to 
propose a “transferential” relation between “practices in the past and historical accounts of them,”Spivak 
is concerned to point to a certain slippage within the model of transference that LaCapra deploys.64  This 
slippage, Spivak claims, is redolent of LaCapra’s “desire”—the desire of the academic intellectual for 
power; for the consolatory “fiction” (LaCapra’s term) of a ”self-consolidating  other.”65 Spivak repudiates 
the category of the “cure” (in scare-quotes in the original) which she takes to be manifested here by 
LaCapra’s transferential model. Her disagreement with LaCapra culminates with her marking the site of 
his desire.66 But now, Spivak abruptly introduces a trajectory of desire—or better still of identification---all 
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her own, as she reverts to a historical figure, the Rani of Sirmur, the subject of an earlier study and one 
of the two women upon whom the chapter pivots.67  “I should have liked to establish a transferential 
relationship with the Rani of Sirmur,” 68 Spivak suddenly interjects without prior warning—referring to this 
woman’s brief striation of the archive as “a king’s wife and a weaker vessel, on the chessboard of the 
Great Game”—or so Spivak somewhat caustically observes elsewhere.69 “I should have liked to establish 
a transferential relationship with the Rani of Sirmur,” let us reiterate in Spivak’s name, and allow her to 
continue: “I pray instead to be haunted by her slight ghost, bypassing the arrogance of the cure.”70 
 It is crucial to my intent to underscore the type of affective performance that Spivak’s rhetoric 
sets in motion. It is a trope of identification which emerges into visibility here, no less. However, it is also 
very much to my point that we register its simultaneous disavowal of an assimilative rapport with—or an 
incorporation, one might say, of—the victim. Instead Spivak will pursue a properly uncanny identification 
in the Freudian sense,71 as she elaborates the progress of a pilgrimage of sorts that brings her to the 
Rani’s former palace where the woman, this particular woman (Gulani or perhaps Gulari, the record 
vacillates in naming her) will continue to elude Spivak as the subject/object of knowledge.72 “As I 
approached her house after a long series of detective maneuvers, I was miming the route of an 
unknowing, a progressive différance, an ‘experience’ of how I could not know her.”73 Despite this 
pilgrimage, Spivak is strict in keeping her distance from the illusion of continuity between the archive—
equally textual and material in this case—and its contemporary interlocutors. To do otherwise would be 
to reduplicate the orientation for which she criticizes LaCapra.74 So the archive becomes the site of an 
interdiction, we might say, where the tenuous possibility of exchange cannot precipitate a therapeutic 
resolution of historical trauma, along the model of Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub.75 Instead, Spivak will 
claim that:  “the epistemic story of imperialism is the story of a series of interruptions, a repeated tearing 
of time that cannot be sutured.”76   
 Spivak’s substitution of “Haunting for transference, the unconsciousness as interruption,” pace 
LaCapra, proceeds in accordance with the strict protocols of her hallmark intervention in “Can the 
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Subaltern Speak.”77  It remains central to my pedagogical intent to insist that this text be read as 
demarcating the lines of an epistemological fracture, a properly Derridean aporia condensed in and as the 
body of the sati, rather than as an entry in the identity politics of subalternity--whether we construe the 
subaltern woman as silent, silenced or eloquent. Spivak is herself quite explicit about this. Noting that the 
archival records stage only the trace of the sati’s prior interpellation by British imperial discourse, on the 
one hand, and refusing to defer to Hindu religious authority, on the other hand, she cautions us that: 
“One never encounters the testimony of the women’s voice-consciousness. […] Faced with the dialectially 
interlocking sentences that are constructible as ‘White men are saving brown women from brown men’ 
and ‘The women wanted to die,’ the postocolonial woman intellectual asks the question of a simple 
semiosis—What does this mean?—and begins to plot a history.”78   
 My insistence on the aporetic status of the sati intersects Spivak’s idiosyncratic coda to her 
discussion of the colonial archive in “Can the Subaltern Speak” where she devotes the last part of the 
article to the enigma of the death of a young woman, Bhubaneswari Bhaduri whose suicide in 1926 
constitutes an oblique form of writing-as-resistance, or speech-across-death in Spivak’s interpretation. 
Spivak suggests that we consider the suicide as “an unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social 
text of sati-suicide” but also insists on our apprehension of Bhaduri’s silencing in a familial context to 
which Spivak is privy.79 The relay which has Bhaduri approximate the enigmatic figure of the Rani or the 
“sati” uses the domestic context to trope on the properly deconstructive problematic that Spivak brings to 
bear on the status of the colonial archive. Spivak makes this point quite clear in a retrospective 
commentary on the readings and misreadings that have become attached to her use of Bhubaneswari 
Bhaduri’s death: 
 The woman to whom Bhubaneswari wrote the letter that was forgotten was my mother’s 
mother. The woman who told me the story was my mother. The woman who refused to 
understand what she has said was my first cousin [. . . .] She was quite like me in education, and 
yet it made no difference. She could not hear this woman who had tried with her suicide using 
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menstruation, that dirty secret, to erase the axioms that endorsed sati. Sati in the piece was not 
given as a generalizable example of the subaltern not speaking, or rather not being able to 
speak—trying to, but not succeeding in being heard.80  
For all its efficacy in supplying us with the consolation of story at precisely the point in the deployment of 
Spivak’s argument that seems to deny us precisely this gratification. For the narrative of Bhubaneswari 
Bhaduri courts its own status as Derridean supplement: seemingly extraneous yet integral to Spivak’s 
intent.81 But its supplementarity is mitigated, in a sense, if we choose to reframe the recourse to Bhaduri 
across her various appearances in “Can the Subaltern Speak” and A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. The 
reinscription of a family context allows us to renegotiate the dimensions of witness that operate here. 
Spivak reworks the colonial subject’s relation to the past as the structural appropriation of social history 
by transforming it into the occasion for a much more private act of mourning. 82  Not historiography, 
then; not a delineation of the all-too-familiar incisions of the epistemic violence of colonialism; or not only 
these things. Spivak’s relation to Bhaduri offers us, in fact, an exemplary instance of postmemory. 
 Marianne Hirsch developed the notion of postmemory with specific relation to first- and 
second-generation Holocaust survivors, although she does indicate its more general applications.83 For 
Hirsch, postmemory is a facet of “intergenerational identification” frequently but not exclusively derived 
from familial contexts. It is a “belated” form of memory “mediated not through recollection but through 
representation, projection, and creation—often based on silence rather than speech, on the invisible 
rather than the visible.”84 The pertinence of postmemory for Spivak is crucial to my argument. What 
intervenes between the curiously impersonal and hyperbolic mourning work that Césaire offers us and 
the minutely calibrated familial reprise of sati-suicide in Spivak is, I would suggest, the consolidation of 
the genre of testimony after the advent of the individuated survivor-witness. 
 Now to read Spivak through her desiring retrieval of a series of dead women is to reposition 
her intervention as a form of mournful performance. It is also to open postcolonial theory up to a 
defamiliarization attendant on agreeing to see it as animated, at least in part, by cultural tropes of 
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witness that are deeply tied to the ascendancy of Holocaust memory. Both postcolonial theory and 
Holocaust studies have something to gain from closer investigation of this intersection. Postcolonial ethics 
needs to engage more fully with its indebtedness to Holocaust memory, not only out of considerations of 
historical accountability85—but also because it has yet to come fully to terms with its own testimonial 
agendas. At the same time, Spivak’s rehearsal of aporetic witness in the face of an archive that refuses to 
be rendered transparent will become increasingly salient, I suggest, over and above the formidable 
ethicity  that it performs for us as we outlive the presence of the Holocaust survivors among us. 86 
 Haunting disrupts. By analogy with Spivak’s consistent refusal of the theorist’s appropriation of 
alterity in the production of a “self-consolidating other,”87 we might see her various invocations of dead 
women as foregrounding an unsettling ethics, an ethics of dispropriation which takes the self as its 
haunt.88 Far from being allowed to assume the status of a surrogate victim in the pursuit of entitlement, 
the self is undone in this model, once, twice, many times over. By grief, certainly.89 But also by language. 
The irredeemable loss of Spivak’s objects of identification—these dead women—is an integral part of this 
story: “Indeed, it is only in their death that they enter a narrative for us, they become figurable.”90 The 
self who desires here can desire only after narration; only as its consequence. The identifications which 
Spivak stages are nothing if not mediated. They are entertained, moreover, in order to underscore 
questions attendant on precisely literary and archival mediation.  
 As the agent of a certain form of testimonial intervention, Spivak is answerable also to the 
materiality of the body, in the sense that no corpse is reducible to another. Thus Bhubaneswari Bhaduri 
does not stand in for the women whose names are “grotesquely mistranscribed” in the police record of 
the East India Company, as if in some instrumental calculus of substitution.91  What is at stake is not 
metaphorical substitution but metonymic relay in relation to a determinate source (or sources) of 
patriarchal and colonial violence. Exhumed as a function of narration, the women whom Spivak invokes 
become envoys of the disjunctive transmission of affect. We are fully in the realm of an engagement with 
the past which repudiates the spurious intimacy of proxy witness or “assimilation.” What the narration 
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cannot, however, afford to do away with in contexts such as these is its debt to embodiment—to the life 
and death of these women—that persists over and above their mobilization for theory. Signification is 
answerable to corporeality, once more. I take this to be one of the fundamental ethical precepts of 
witnessing. 
 The relationality of witness that Spivak enacts here gestures towards a form of politics that 
can be retrieved from traumatic identifications, over and above the recognizably high modernist 
injunctions to ethics that emerge from, for instance, Eaglestone’s circumscription of testimony-as-
disidentification. I take the notion of relationality from the work of Judith Butler in Precarious Life (2004), 
cognizant like Butler, of the fact that relationality returns us to the political. Relationality returns us, 
moreover, to the political as a site of vulnerability where the duty to mourn, or the possibility of 
mourning, is incipient. Butler reminds us that: “[Each] of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of 
the social vulnerability of our bodies—as a site of desire and physical vulnerability, as a site of a publicity 
at once assertive and exposed. Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted 
bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by 
virtue of that exposure.”92 That vulnerability unto death has historically overdetermined the social 
constitution of the body interpellated as Jewish under Nazism, or as black under colonialism, is an 
important component of what Holocaust studies and postcolonial theory have to teach us, across 
disciplinary divides. But indiscriminate identification with such vulnerability, in the first-person singular, 
occludes precisely the singularity of the changing historical contingencies to which Holocaust studies and 
postcolonial theory, at their best, have respectively devoted themselves. To rehearse the understanding 
that I am vulnerable because you have been vulnerable may devolve into the banal justification of 
anticipatory or retaliatory violence— the “never again” rhetoric of Israeli state violence, bolstered by its 
invocation of the “six million,” for instance. This is not the identification with which I seek to conclude. 
Rather I propose that we track our identifications as slender portents of our capacity for relationality 
upon which empathy is presaged. Always here, wherever I am and wherever I look, closest to home.93 
The genres of traumatic identification are not yet manifestos of the various political projects that our 
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collective renegotiations of the condition of exposure to vulnerability would entail. They do, however, 
constitute one form of prelude to living on in the aftermath. 
 
* In memoriam, Oren Gani (17 October 1950 – 4 November 2010).  
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